What a waste: the generation and disposal of trash imposes costs on society and the environment: should we be doing more? by Jane Katz









































The images in the media were vivid—and, well, disgust-
ing. In March 1987, the Mobro 4000, the garbage barge
from Islip, Long Island, sailed down the coast piled high
with 3,100 tons of rotting garbage, medical waste, old
tires, cardboard containers, and other trash from local
schools and businesses, looking for a place to discharge
its cargo. Wandering all the way from New York to North
Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, Mexico, and Belize,
no community wanted to let it unload. 
The story was front-page news for weeks and resulted in
considerable public debate and finger pointing. Society







At the Central Landfill in Johnston,
Rhode Island, trucks are required by
law to dump at least six inches of
dirt over the day’s trash.Cans and other metal items ready to
be compacted and baled for recycling
at the Wellesley Municipal Recycling
and Disposal Facility, Wellesley,
Massachusetts.Regional Review Q1 2002 25
was creating trash faster than we could find space to put it.
Eventually, we would all be buried under a giant pile of garbage,
victims of our own excessive consumption and wastefulness.
A senior administrator at the Environmental Protection Agency
warned of a “deluge of garbage.” What’s more, we were using
up resources, polluting the environment, and pushing these
costs on to future generations. 
Communities began to take serious notice. At the time, al-
most 80 percent of trash was destined for landfill; another 10
percent was incinerated; only about 10 percent was recycled.
Nearly 3,000 municipal landfills had closed between 1982 and
1987; many more were scheduled to close over the next sever-
al years. There seemed to be a limited number of alternatives.
We could reduce the amount of trash we generated, or increase
the amount we recycled or burned.
In an effort to reduce trash production, many communities
began to charge households for the amount of trash they gen-
erated; others began recycling efforts in earnest. In 1988, less
than 1,000 communities had curbside recycling programs; by
2000, at least half the population could leave their bottles, cans,
and newspapers at the curb.
Fifteen years later, the subject of trash seems to have lost some
of its heat. In the media, it now
takes a back seat to articles on glob-
al warming and depletion of the
ozone layer. What happened? Have
our policies worked? Or are we still
going to be buried under our own
trash? 
MORE TRASH
The world certainly hasn’t stopped
producing trash or, as it’s known
technically, municipal solid waste—that is, all the solid waste
generated by households, institutions (such as schools and hos-
pitals), and businesses, except for industry and agriculture. Mu-
nicipal solid waste includes such materials as containers, food
scraps, construction materials, medical waste, miscellaneous in-
organic trash, including hazardous materials such as aerosol
cans, paint, pesticides, and batteries. It also includes sludge and
ash generated by sewage treatment and incinerators.
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the United States generated 231 million tons of municipal waste
in 1999, up from 88 tons in 1960 and up almost one-third since
the furor over the Mobro 4000 in 1987. On a per capita basis,
the numbers are a little less dramatic. In 1999, the average
American produced 4.64 pounds per person per day, up from
4 pounds in 1987. About 38 percent (by weight) is paper; 23
percent is food and yard waste; another 11 percent is plastic.
World production of waste tends to grow along with world
population and GDP, say David Beede of the U.S. Department
of Commerce and David Bloom of Harvard—with population
growth having a larger impact than income. However, they
point out that technological improvements in product and con-
tainer design are likely to slow the growth of waste, as designs
evolve to use more aluminum and plastic (and less steel and
glass), and to require less material overall. 
High-income economies, such as the United States and Eu-
ropean nations, account for more than their share of waste per
capita, note Beede and Bloom. These nations contain about
one-sixth of the population, yet generate more than one-fourth
of its municipal waste. However, developing countries produce
more waste per dollar of GDP; they account for less than one-
half the world’s GDP, but produce nearly three-quarters of its
municipal waste. Here is one way to think about it: High-in-
come countries produce and consume more per person; low-
income countries create more waste from a given amount of pro-
duction. Paper is the largest component (by weight) in
high-income countries, food waste predominates in low-in-
come countries. 
Historical evidence suggests that, on a per person basis, mod-
ern household waste production may not be much higher than
early last century, when coal ash and horse manure were sig-
nificant sources of waste. Coal ash production alone created
an estimated 3.3 pounds of waste per person per day in Man-
hattan in the early 1900s. Today, however, a greater share of
waste comes from industry—iron and steel production, power
generation, pulp and paper industries, and oil and gas extrac-
tion, which are not included in municipal waste calculations.
Historians also note that nineteenth-century cities were hard-
ly pristine. In Boston, for example, trash and human waste were
routinely dumped into local waterways or primitive sewers that
flowed into Boston Harbor, creating “foul air” as the tide came
in, particularly on warm summer nights.
Whatever the historical figures, few dispute that collecting
and disposing of garbage takes scarce resources, or that the gen-
eration and disposal of trash imposes costs on society and the
environment. Post Mobro, researchers have made attempts to
estimate these costs. These estimates should be thought of as
rough guides at best. Their accuracy depends on the state of
scientific knowledge and our ability to accurately assess the en-
vironmental and health risks posed by trash. For example,
something thought safe at one point in time could later be found
harmful. Accurate estimates also depend on valuing the bene-
fits to individuals outside the local community, including fu-
ture generations—obviously no easy task. 
Researchers generally make such estimates by looking at the
alternative—disposal in a modern, state-of-the-art landfill. That
is, they assume that the benefits of reducing waste are equal to
the full social cost of disposing of that waste. They figure so-
cial cost by taking landfill operating costs and adding in trans-
portation costs and environmental costs (truck noise, unsight-
liness or odor, and harm to human health or the environment).
In reviewing the evidence to date, Economist Thomas Kinna-
man concludes that reducing garbage does not offer “huge”
benefits. He cites calculations by Robin Jenkins that suggest
that the social benefits of reducing municipal waste appear to
be about about 60 cents for each 32-gallon bag of trash that is
eliminated. However, this figure doesn’t include any contri-
bution that landfills make to acid rain or global warming (land-
fills account for 28 percent of U.S. methane emissions). Con-
sequently, it may underestimate the benefits of trash reduction. 
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CHARGING BY THE BAG
In the late 1980s, local communities got serious about trying to
reduce trash generation, in part, because of the Mobro. By 1999,
more than 4,000 communities had introduced programs that
assessed households’ “per unit” of garbage collected. Some
charged for each can or bag; others set a base rate and levied
additional fees per unit, or for collections above a specified lev-
el. Municipalities that adopted these policies hoped to en-
courage households to consume less, throw away less, recycle
more, and buy items with less packaging. They also hoped pro-
ducers would feel pressure to be more economical and envi-
ronmentally aware in product and package design. 
Economists were pleased. They had long argued that per-
unit charges would reduce overall garbage generation at a low-
er cost than setting a maximum quantity standard (that is, lim-
iting the amount of garbage a household can throw away).
Charging per unit encourages households and firms that can
adjust at least cost to do so—for example, those who can easi-
ly compost or buy products with less packaging. And it does
not force a specific standard on those who would find reduc-
ing their generation of trash extremely difficult or costly (that
is, more costly than paying the imposed price per bag). In this
view, so long as households face the full cost of their con-
sumption and disposal decisions, they can make socially effi-
cient choices.
Yet, in communities that adopted per unit fees, trash collec-
tions have declined, but the drop in tonnage has been relative-
ly small. Why? It turned out that the incentives created by these
programs have been complicated.
First, most programs charge by the bag, not by weight, giv-
ing households an incentive to pack trash bags more tightly and
even buy compactors. Indeed, Thomas Kinnaman and Don
Fullerton actually measured trash collection in Charlottesville,
Virginia, both before and after the town started charging $0.80
per 32-gallon bag of trash. They found that garbage decreased
by 37 percent by volume(number of bags), but only 14 percent
by weight. The reason: weight per bag increased by one-third,
rising from 15 to 20 pounds per bag.
Pricing per unit also may encourage illegal trash disposal,
such as throwing waste in commercial dumpsters, taking it to
a town that does not charge per bag, tossing it in an empty lot,
or burning it without a permit. Again, Fullerton and Kinna-
man estimated that more than one-quarter of the reduction in
garbage that follows the introduction of pricing by the bag may
be the result of illegal dumping. Other studies find illegal dump-
ing is less significant. 
Beyond the simple issue of trash reduction, many programs
don’t differentiate between what is in the bags. So food waste
and other relatively innocuous trash is charged the same fee as
more hazardous garbage. Most states now ban batteries and
whole tires from regular landfill, and some have even more strin-
gent rules. Vermont bans oil-based paint, large quantities of
latex paint, paint thinner, and mercury devices; Massachusetts
bans cathode ray tubes (which contain several pounds of lead
to protect viewers from radiation). But as with pricing by the
bag, households often ignore or evade these regulations. After
televisions and computer monitors were banned from regular
garbage pickup (because of cathode ray tubes), many commu-
nities reported finding them abandoned in empty lots and on
the street. “The sidewalks are growing TVs,” an official from
Beverly, Massachusetts, told the Boston Globe.
Reducing cheating would make trash generation more re-
sponsive to fees and increase the pressure from consumers to
improve package design. But monitoring and tracking down
cheaters is difficult—and the costs of doing so might not out-
weigh the benefits. The decentralized nature of the production
and disposal of household garbage—precisely what makes user
fees efficient—also raises monitoring and enforcement costs.
Others point out that simple administrative costs—distribut-
ing bags, keeping records, collecting the fee, and so on—could
easily exceed the estimated $3 to $13 per person per year bene-
Total municipal solid waste generated in the United States has
grown substantially, nearly doubling since 1970. Per capita in-
creases have been much smaller. Waste per person per day has
barely risen over the last decade, even during a period of strong
economic growth.
At the time the Mobro set sail in 1987, the United States
sent about 140 million tons of municipal waste to the nation’s
landfills, an all-time high. But as a share of total waste, the
amount going to landfills had already peaked, in part because
increased use of incineration and in part because of a rise
in recycling. Americans now recycle or compost about
28 percent of all municipal solid waste, up dramatically
from 6 percent in 1960.
source: Franklin Associates, Ltd.
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fits. On the plus side, however, most analysts who have looked
at the question believe that charging by the bag does increase
the amount of trash that households and businesses recycle.
USE IT AGAIN
Recycling not only decreases the amount of garbage headed for
landfills, but also reduces energy use (and the resultant air and
water emissions) as compared with manufacturing items from
virgin materials. After the Mobro, many communities intro-
duced curbside recycling programs, which are convenient for
households since they don’t require people to transport trash
themselves. Nationally, 9,700 communities operated curbside
recycling programs by 2000, up from about 1,000 in 1989. In
Massachusetts, 159 of 351 communities (78 percent of the pop-
ulation) had curbside pickup; Connecticut served 100 percent
of its residents. By contrast, less than 20 percent of people liv-
ing in Kentucky, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Virginia
could leave recyclables at the curb.
In many communities, recycling was made mandatory—at
least for single-family homes. However, monitoring and en-
forcement—making sure people
separate their paper, bottles, and
plastic containers—is costly, and
even when violations are discov-
ered, punishment is generally light.
Some towns set goals for the percent
of waste they want to recycle, but
reaching these goals has proved dif-
ficult; towns often later relax stan-
dards or extend deadlines. 
In most curbside programs, a
separate fleet of trucks collects recyclables (garbage trucks are
not equipped to handle both jobs) and unloads at a material-re-
covery center. These centers can be simple or highly automat-
ed, with magnets to extract ferrous metals, blowers to separate
light materials (such as plastics) by weight, and magnets sus-
pended above a conveyor belt that sort and separate aluminum.
Biodegradable material, such as food and yard waste, can be
composted or converted (through natural microbial break-
down) into methane gas that can be captured and used as fuel. 
By many measures, recycling programs have been a huge
success. The nation’s recycling rate, only about 10 percent in
1980, reached 22 percent in 1999, with an additional 6 percent
composted. According to press accounts, some people in com-
munities without curbside programs are so intent on recycling,
they carry their bottles and cans to nearby towns. And most an-
alysts credit the increase in recycling with the decline in the per-
centage of municipal waste that reaches landfills (see chart).
However, increased use of recycled materials has been stub-
bornly slow, and the economics remain somewhat fragile. Cer-
tain products, particularly metals, are cost-effective to reuse;
others, such as glass and certain kinds of paper, are still less
expensive to produce from virgin material. Plastic—a petrole-
um product—would seem an obvious candidate for recycling.
But it is costly to collect, transport, sort, and clean discarded
plastics; and whenever oil prices drop, the price of recycled plas-
tic drops, too. Prices for many recycled materials have remained
stable over the past decade but, like other commodities, they
can be volatile—and tend to be particularly low when the econ-
omy slows. In a recent article in theNew York Times, New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg claimed that 40 percent of the
cans and bottles collected in the city were never recycled. 
Why has it proved so hard to increase the demand for recy-
cled goods? To some degree, it is the “chicken and egg” prob-
lem. In capital-intensive industries, firms have been slow to
adopt the use of recycled materials because it required invest-
ing in expensive new equipment. In the paper industry, for ex-
ample, existing equipment was suitable for virgin paper only.
Without a steady and reliable supply of recycled paper, firms
were reluctant to commit themselves to investing in new ma-
chines. And before they would do so, an industry for de-ink-
ing newsprint also needed to evolve. In the case of plastic bot-
tles, recycling has been complicated by the introduction of
technology that allows production of bottles with barrier labels
or colors that keep products fresher (by keeping oxygen out and
carbon dioxide in). However, these bottles can cause hazing
and spoil otherwise good batches of clear recycled plastic. And
the equipment to sort them out is expensive.
Moreover, appeals for the environment alone are not always
enough to sway consumer buying decisions. A recent poll cit-
ed in the Wall Street Journalfound that only 29 percent of shop-
pers had recently purchased a product with a label claiming it
was environmentally safe or biodegradable. Gerber switched
from glass to plastic bottles after 70 percent of its customers said
they would prefer the convenience of plastic. And Seventh Gen-
eration, a firm that makes napkins, tissues, and other household
products, recently changed its slogan from “products for a
healthy planet” to “safer for you and the environment” because
it found that “personal wellness” and safety were stronger con-
sumer draws.
Over the long run, however, reductions in the cost of collec-
tion and separation may make recycling more cost-effective.
Firms are currently tinkering with optical recognition technol-
ogy and electric charges that can efficiently separate plastics,
and with solvents that remove labels. Industry-wide standards
for new materials (such as the plastic barrier bottles) could re-
duce material incompatibility in the recycling process. Costs
may drop with the next generation of garbage trucks that can
pick up trash and recyclables at once. And new uses for recy-
cled materials may be developed, encouraged by more reliable
supplies. Even now, one can buy bathroom tiles made from re-
cycled glass, ground-cover from recycled tires, and “wood”
decking made from recycled plastic.
A number of studies have tried to assess whether recycling
is socially efficient. To answer this question, they look, not at
whether revenues from selling recycled material cover the costs
of the programs, but at whether the benefits of recycling are
greater than the cost of the alternative—putting the waste in
landfills. Although the exact figures vary, studies generally con-
clude that the costs of at least some recycling efforts exceed the
social benefits. However, most of these studies don’t take into






at the time the
set sailThese refrigerators, at Rhode Island’s Central
Landfill, are waiting to have chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) removed; later the steel will be recycled.
The tires behind them will be sent to Connecticut
to be burned for energy. In the background, the
grassy hill is landfill space already filled to capacity. Regional Review Q1 2002 29
energy use from manufacturing from recycled (rather than vir-
gin) materials or any benefit from the conserving of nonre-
newable resources. It is not clear whether doing so would
change their conclusions.
UP IN SMOKE
After energy prices rose during the 1970s, some thought that
burning our trash would solve both the energy problem and the
garbage problem in one fell swoop. In 1985, only about 7 per-
cent of the nation’s municipal waste was burned; by the mid-
1990s, the figure rose to more than 17 percent. 
Since then, the number of incinerators and percent of waste
disposed of in this way has declined. Garbage incinerators ex-
hibit scale economies; it takes a lot of trash to make them cost-
effective. Some places thought that they could achieve the scale
economies by requiring local communities to use area facilities.
But the Supreme Court struck down these laws, forcing incin-
erators to compete directly with cheaper landfill operators. In
1994, the Supreme Court also ruled that some incinerator ash
was toxic and must be disposed of as hazardous waste, raising
costs even more. Concerns about
safety and public reluctance to site
the facilities has also contributed to
the decline.
Today, about 15 percent of the na-
tion’s municipal waste is burned,
just a little more than at the time of
the Mobro. Incineration remains
more prominent in the New Eng-
land and Mid-Atlantic states where
land and landfills are costly, and
high population densities produce a lot of trash. In 2000, Con-
necticut incinerated almost two-thirds of its solid waste; Mass-
achusetts burned one-third. 
NOT IN MY BACKYARD
Trash that is neither recycled nor incinerated is destined for the
town dump—or its modern-day equivalent, the sanitary land-
fill. While it was the fear of running out of space that was most
prominent in the controversy surrounding the Mobro, this con-
cern was not grounded in fact. What wasgoing on? The waste
disposal industry, especially landfill, was undergoing restruc-
turing—precisely because of more stringent environmental reg-
ulations.
In the nation’s early days, people threw their garbage any
place that was handy. But by the nineteenth century, most U.S.
cities had established a town dump. Even into the 1970s, most
towns maintained a dump, charging only a few dollars per ton
for waste disposal. However, many were open pits that attract-
ed flies and rats, and produced air pollution and noxious smells.
Although improvements (such as covering the pits with dirt)
were made in some localities, the EPA estimated that as many
as 14,000 communities still were using open dumps in 1972.
By the 1970s, concerns over pollution and groundwater con-
tamination, and improvements in technology resulted in pres-
sure to clean up. Federal legislation was passed that imposed
standards on the construction, operation, and closure of land-
fills. Today, rules require operators to line the landfill with a
thick clay or plastic shield, collect and treat any material that
leaches out, monitor groundwater, and cover new layers of
garbage with six inches of dirt within hours. 
These new sanitary landfills are considerably cleaner and
safer, but also more expensive. Construction costs rose as high
as $500,000 per acre, and made large landfills far more eco-
nomical than small ones. One 1994 study found that the aver-
age cost of operating a sanitary landfill decreased 70 percent as
capacity rose from 250 to 2,976 tons per day—and this was be-
fore all current regulations were in place. Expanding existing
landfills became both cost-effective and politically attractive, as
opposition from local residents made it harder to site new
dumps. These larger regional facilities could also be located
away from population centers in places where land costs were
low and the threat to local residents was minimized.
The industry began to restructure. Many town dumps closed;
others transformed themselves and got out of the burial busi-
ness. In upscale Wellesley, Massachusetts, residents drop off
trash and recyclables and take home abandoned treasures from
the Wellesley Municipal Recycling and Disposal facility, which
features picnic tables, a park bench, and a collection of recycled
books—including a librarian. After recycling, the remaining
waste is taken to a landfill in Fall River.
Despite many closings, the increasingly large scale of the re-
maining facilities meant that landfill capacity was not a nation-
al problem at the time of the Mobro. In 1986, 42 states had land-
fill capacity sufficient to last at least five years; many had
capacity for more than ten years. So while some landfills near
population centers were due to close or be filled, the nation’s
total landfill space was more than sufficient. Since then, capacity
has continued to increase, rising to about 20 years’ worth in
1997. Even the landfill methane emissions thought to contribute
to global warming have begun to decline—the result of a re-
duction in the volume of waste in landfills and an increase in
the amount of methane captured and used as fuel. 
ACROSS STATE LINES:
HOW THE MOBRO 4000 GOT STRANDED
So while the Mobro focused public attention on trash dispos-
al, the nation did not generally face a shortage in landfill ca-
pacity. What many communities didface were higher prices for
disposal, precisely because of improvements in environmental
regulations. The new, more stringent standards for landfills
raised the cost of building and operating them. In the New Eng-
land and Mid-Atlantic states, fees paid to landfills ran as high
as $50 to $100 a ton. On Long Island, the short-run problem
was particularly acute. All landfills were scheduled to close by
1990 because the high water table meant that leaking chemicals
threatened the water supply. Islip’s landfill stopped accepting
commercial waste and disposal fees skyrocketed.
This created the opportunity to transport trash to less popu-
lated areas where land was cheaper and the potential risk to lo-
cal residents was small. Some states began to “specialize” in





but are also 
more costly to
build and operateabout 8 to 9 percent of the nation’s municipal waste, was trans-
ported across state lines. The nation’s three largest net importers
of trash were Pennsylvania (12.2 million tons), Virginia (3.9 mil-
lion tons), and Michigan (2.8 million tons). In New England,
only Maine (475,000 tons) and New Hampshire (114,000 tons)
were net importers.
Most economists do not view this as a problem, assuming
that pollution costs from transporting the garbage are taken into
account. From their standpoint, waste disposal is an industry
like any other, with underlying regional costs and other differ-
ences that make geographic variation and concentration some-
thing to be expected. However, analysts have expressed con-
cern that encouraging the importation of out-of-state trash may
undercut a state’s efforts to reduce its own trash production. 
And the circumstances that produced the Mobro 4000? Its
fate was a consequence of stronger environmental policies and
entrepreneurial incompetence, not a shortage of landfill space.
As local landfill closures and increased tipping fees began to en-
courage trash shipments, Salvatore Avellino, reputed mob boss
of Long Island’s trash-hauling business, arranged to dispose
of Islip’s trash for $86 a ton. He planned to load the trash on a
barge, ship it to Louisiana, then bury it in a local landfill for $5
a ton. Later, the methane would be captured and the profits split
with farmers and local public officials. Unfortunately, his part-
ner in this venture neglected to “sufficiently nail down” an
agreement before the Mobro set sail. When the partner tried
to make a quick deal with a dump in North Carolina (which
had extra capacity), state regulators got nervous and refused,
worrying that the boat contained toxic waste. (There had been
earlier instances of organized crime members hiding hazardous
waste inside normal-looking bales of trash.) 
Once the media frenzy began, no community was willing to
take the trash, even though many places had extra capacity and
accepted shipments both before and afterward. After two
months at sea, the Mobro returned to Brooklyn, where its car-
go was incinerated. Mr. Avellino eventually went to prison on
an unrelated matter after pleading guilty to conspiring to mur-
der two trash haulers in August 1987.
TOXIC AVENGER
There was bound to be a backlash. The outlines of the Mobro
story and landfill issues became more widely known; articles
appearing in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal
came down particularly hard on curbside recycling programs,
which are actually quite popular among voters. Recently, the
subject has been in the news again, after New York City May-
or Bloomberg proposed cutting back recycling to save money. 
Some environmental activists have argued that overempha-
sizing household trash merely assuages the guilt of out-of-con-
trol consumers, while diverting money and effort from more se-
rious environmental threats—air and water pollution produced
by industrial and agricultural waste, automobiles, and long-run
climate change. EPA estimates suggest the cancer risk from
properly operated modern landfills would average fewer than
0.08 cases per year. Many analysts argue that these hazards are
dwarfed by industrial and agricultural sources of pollution, such
as industrial waste dumps and wastes from large animal-feed-
ing operations. Collection, monitoring, and enforcement are of-
ten more cost-effective than for households, since the toxic ma-
terial is produced in fewer, larger locations. 
Others point out that it might make sense for local govern-
ments and households to focus on the proper disposal of haz-
ardous waste. Cleaning an area contaminated by hazardous
waste is considerably more expensive than disposing of it prop-
erly in the first place, since the surrounding material must also
be treated as hazardous. And then there is the prospect of de-
stroying the ozone layer and causing long-run climate change.
The recent spectacular and unexpected collapse of the Larsen
B Ice Shelf in Antarctica only underscores the view that per-
haps we ought to concentrate more resources on understand-
ing and preventing global warming. 
Still, it is easy to overstate the case against policies intended
to reduce trash and encourage recycling. While the improve-
ment in landfill regulation began prior to the Mobro, continued
public support has helped in passing the current, even more
stringent, standards. The best evidence to date suggests that the
net benefits of recycling programs are not enormous, but then
neither are the net costs. Over time, the benefits of recycling
might rise and the costs drop. And while it is important to fo-
cus on the most pressing environmental problems, public sup-
port of recycling is heartening in its good intentions. We cer-
tainly don’t want to toss those out in the trash. S
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TOSSED OUT IN 1999
WEIGHT GENERATED PERCENT
(MILLIONS OF TONS) OF TOTAL
total u.s. municipal solid waste 230 100
Paper and paperboard 88 38
Yard trimmings 28 12






Rubber and leather 63
Miscellaneous other 73
by selected products
Containers and packaging 76 33
Corrugated boxes 31 14
Glass bottles and jars 11 5
Plastic packaging 73
Cans (steel and aluminum) 73
Plastic bottles 42
Milk cartons < 1 < 1
Newspapers 14 6





source: Franklin Associates, Ltd.